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Abstract
A reduction in inflation can fuel run-ups in housing prices if people suﬀer
from money illusion. For example, investors who decide whether to rent or buy
a house by simply comparing monthly rent and mortgage payments do not take
into account that inflation lowers future real mortgage costs. We decompose the
price-rent ratio in a rational component — meant to capture the proxy eﬀect and
risk premia — and an implied mispricing. We find that inflation and nominal
interest rates explain a large share of the time-series variation of the mispricing,
and that the tilt eﬀect is very unlikely to rationalize this finding.
Keywords: Housing, Real Estate, Inflation, Inflation Illusion, Mortgages, Behav-
ioral Finance
JEL classification: G12, R2.
∗We benefited from helpful comments from an anonymous referee, Yakov Amihud, Patrick Bolton,
Smita Brunnermeier, John Campbell, James Choi, Albina Danilova, Aureo de Paula, Emir Emi-
ray, Will Goetzmann, Kevin Lansing, Chris Mayer, Alex Michaelides, Stefan Nagel, Martin Oehmke,
Maureen O’Hara (the editor), Filippos Papakonstantinou, Lasse Pedersen, Adriano Rampini, Matt
Richardson, Bob Shiller, Matt Spiegel, Jeremy Stein, Demosthenes Tambakis, Haibin Zhu and sem-
inar and conference participants at the Bank of England, Cambridge-Princeton conference, CSEF-
IGIER symposium, Duke-UNC Asset Pricing Conference, 2006 Econometric Society Winter Meet-
ings in Boston, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Harvard University, IIES Stockholm, London
Business School, London School of Economics, NBER Behavioral Meetings, Oxford University, Queen-
Mary University, RFS Bubble Conference in Indiana, University of Copenhagen, University of Salerno,
Wharton School, University of Wisconsin-Madison Real Estate Research conference, and Yale Con-
ference on Behavioral Economics. We also thank the BIS for providing part of the housing data used
in this analysis. Brunnermeier acknowledges financial support from the National Science Foundation
and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation.
†Princeton University, Department of Economics, Bendheim Center for Finance, Princeton, NJ
08544-1021, NBER and CEPR, e-mail: markus@princeton.edu, http://www.princeton.edu/∼markus
‡Department of Economics, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE,
United Kingdom, and CEPR, e-mail: C.Julliard@lse.ac.uk, http://personal.lse.ac.uk/julliard/
1
1 Introduction
Housing prices have reached unprecedented heights in recent years. Sharp run-ups
followed by busts are a common feature of the time-series of housing prices. Figure
1 illustrates diﬀerent real housing price indices and shows that this phenomenon has
been observed in several OECD countries.
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Figure 1: Residential property (real) price indices for a group of Anglo-Saxon countries
(Panel A) and for Scandinavian countries and other European countries (Panel B). Base
period is 1976:Q1.
Shiller (2005) documents similar patterns for other countries and cities over shorter
samples. Moreover, Case and Shiller (1989, 1990) document that housing price changes
are predictable and suggest that this might be due to ineﬃciency in the housing mar-
ket. There are several potential reasons for this market ineﬃciency — one of them
being money illusion. The housing market is particularly well suited to study money
illusion, since frictions make it diﬃcult for professional investors to arbitrage possible
mispricings away.
In this paper we identify an empirical proxy for the mispricing in the housing market
and show that it is largely explained by movements in inflation. Inflation matters and
it matters in a particular way. Our analysis shows that a reduction in inflation can
generate substantial increases in housing prices in a setting in which agents are prone
to money illusion. For example, people who simply base the decision of whether to
rent or buy a house on a comparison between monthly rent and monthly payment of
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a fixed nominal interest rate mortgage suﬀer from money illusion. They mistakenly
assume that real and nominal interest rates move in lockstep. Hence, they wrongly
attribute a decrease in inflation to a decline in the real interest rate and consequently
underestimate the real cost of future mortgage payments. Therefore, they cause an
upward pressure on housing prices when inflation declines.
To identify whether the link between housing price movements and inflation is due
to money illusion, we first have to isolate the rational components of price changes that
are due to movements in fundamentals such as land and construction costs, housing
quality, property taxes, and demographics (Mankiw and Weil (1989)).1 We do so in
two stages. First, we focus on the price-rent ratio to insulate our analysis from fun-
damental movements that aﬀect housing prices and rents symmetrically. Even though
renting and buying a house are not perfect substitutes, the price-rent ratio implicitly
controls for movements in the underlying service flow. Second, we try to isolate rational
channels through which inflation could influence the price-rent ratio. Several authors
including Fama (1981) have claimed that the negative relationship between inflation
and the price of real assets (like stocks) might be due to a “proxy eﬀect”: high inflation
and/or high inflation expectations are a bad signal about future economic conditions.
Moreover, higher inflation might make the economy more risky or agents more risk
averse, generating a risk premium that is correlated with inflation. Also, an increase
in inflation reduces the after-tax user cost of housing, potentially driving up hous-
ing demand (Poterba (1984)). We use a Campbell and Shiller (1988) decomposition
that takes into account housing specific risk factors, (such as probability of moving
interacted with cross-sectional variation of house prices), to decompose the price-rent
ratio into rational components (expected future returns on housing investment and
rent growth rates) and a mispricing component. After controlling for rational chan-
nels, we find that inflation has substantial explanatory power for the sharp run-ups
and downturns of the housing market.
Figure 2 depicts the time series of the (estimated) mispricing component of the
price-rent ratio in the U.K. housing market and its fitted values obtained using inflation
as the only explanatory variable. The first thing to notice is that the mispricing shows
sharp and persistent run-ups during the sample period. Moreover, the fitted series
closely tracks the mispricing.
The close link between inflation and housing prices could be due to a departure
from rationality and/or financing frictions. First, as argued by Modigliani and Cohn
(1979), if agents suﬀer from money illusion, their valuation of an asset will be inversely
related to the overall level of inflation in the economy. This explanation of housing
1These variables alone are generally not able to capture the sharp run-ups in housing prices. It has
become common in the empirical literature to add cubic ‘frenzy’ terms in the housing price regressions
(see Hendry (1984) and Muellbauer and Murphy (1997)) and the rational expectations hypothesis has
been rejected by the data (Clayton (1996)).
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Figure 2: Mispricing and fitted series based on U.K. inflation
price run-ups would also be in line with the finding of McCarthy and Peach (2004)
that the sharp run-up in the U.S. housing market since the late 1990s can be largely
explained by taking into account the contemporaneous reduction of nominal mortgage
costs. A special form of money illusion arises if home owners are averse to realizing
nominal losses. Second, in an inflationary environment, the nominal payments on a
fixed-payment mortgage are higher by a factor that is roughly proportional to the
reciprocal of the nominal interest rate. This causes the real financing cost to shift
towards the early periods of the mortgage, therefore causing a potential reduction in
housing demand and prices. This is the so called tilt eﬀect of inflation (see Lessard
and Modigliani (1975) and Tucker (1975)). Nevertheless, why the tilt eﬀect should
matter cannot be fully explained in a rational setting since financial instruments that
are immune to changes in inflation, like the price level adjusted mortgage (PLAM) or
the graduate payment mortgage (GPM), have been available to house buyers since at
least the 1970s. Most importantly, in Section 4.1 we perform a series of tests which
make it seem very unlikely that the tilt eﬀect is the driving force of the empirical
link between inflation and housing prices. Third, if fixed interest rate mortgages are
not portable, individuals that have bought a house and have locked in a low nominal
interest rate might be less willing to sell their current house to buy a better one when
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nominal interest rates are higher. Hence, an increase in inflation that raises the nominal
interest rate might depress the price of better-quality residential properties. On the
other hand, a reduction in inflation and nominal interest rates would free current home
owners from this “lock-in” eﬀect. We provide evidence that the “lock-in” eﬀect is not
driving our results. Further, we show that housing supply elasticity is heterogeneous
across U.S. states due to diﬀerences in population density. We show that given this
heterogeneity in supply elasticity, money illusion can lead to heterogeneous regional
price dynamics as observed in the data.
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the
related literature on money illusion, market frictions and speculative trading. Section
3 formally analyzes the link between inflation and housing prices using the U.K. housing
market as a case study.2 In particular, Subsection 3.1 provides a first assessment of
the empirical link between price-rent ratio and inflation. Subsection 3.2 decomposes
the price-rent ratio isolating the rational channels from an estimated mispricing and
shows that the mispricing is largely explained by changes in the rate of inflation.
Section 4 argues that market frictions — like the tilt eﬀect (Subsection 4.1) and lock-in
eﬀect (Subsection 4.2) — are unlikely to be the cause of the link between inflation and
mispricing on the housing market. Section 5 confirms our main empirical results using
U.S. data and studies the heterogeneity of housing supply elasticity across the U.S. A
final section concludes and a full description of the data sources, methodological details
and additional robustness checks are provided in the appendix.
2 Related Literature
2.1 Money Illusion and Psychological Biases
“An economic theorist can, of course, commit no greater crime than to
assume money illusion.” Tobin (1972)
“In fact, I am persuadable — indeed, pretty much persuaded — that money
illusion is a fact of life.” Blinder (2000)
In this section we sketch the links to the existing literature. In particular, we
review previous definitions of money illusion, relate it to the psychology literature and
summarize the empirical evidence on the eﬀect of money illusion on the stock market.
Definition of Money Illusion. Fisher (1928, p. 4) defines money illusion as “the
failure to perceive that the dollar, or any other unit of money, expands or shrinks in
2We first focus on the U.K. market since the better quality of the housing data, the longer sample
period in housing prices (1966:Q2—2004:Q4) and inflation linked bonds (1982:Q1-2004:Q4), the avail-
ability of PLAM and GPM mortgage schemes, and the fact that most U.K. mortgages are portable,
allow for sharper and more robust inference.
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value.”3 Patinkin (1965, p. 22) refers to money illusion as any deviation from decision
making in purely real terms: “An individual will be said to be suﬀering from such an
illusion if his excess-demand functions for commodities do not depend [...] solely on
relative prices and real wealth...” Leontief (1936) is more formal in his definition by
arguing that there is no money illusion if demand and supply functions are homogeneous
of degree zero in all nominal prices.
Related Psychological Biases. Money illusion is also very closely related to other
psychological judgement and decision biases. In a perfect world money is a veil and
only real prices matter. Individuals face the same situation after doubling all nominal
prices and wages.
The framing eﬀect states that alternative representations (framing) of the same
decision problem can lead to substantially diﬀerent behavior (Tversky and Kahneman
(1981)). Shafir, Diamond, and Tversky (1997) document that agents’ preferences de-
pend to a large degree on whether the problem is phrased in real terms or nominal
terms. This framing eﬀect has implications on (i) time preferences as well as on (ii)
risk attitudes. For example, if the problem is phrased in nominal terms, agents prefer
the nominally less risky option to the alternative which is less risky in real terms. That
is, they avoid nominal risk rather than real risk. If on the other hand the problem is
stated in real terms, their preference ranking reverses. The degree to which individuals
ignore real terms depends on the relative saliency of the nominal versus real frame.
Anchoring is a special form of framing eﬀect. It refers to the phenomenon that
people tend to be unduly influenced by some arbitrary quantities when presented with
a decision problem. This is the case even when the quantity is clearly uninformative.
For example, the nominal purchasing price of a house can serve as an anchor for a
reference price even when the real price can be easily derived.4 Genesove and Mayer
(2001) document that investors are reluctant to realize nominal losses.
While individuals understand well that inflation increases the prices of goods they
buy, they often overlook inflation eﬀects which work through indirect channels, e.g.
general equilibrium eﬀects. For example, Shiller (1997a) documents survey evidence
that the public does not think that nominal wages and inflation comove over the long-
run. Shiller (1997b) provides evidence that less than a third of the respondents in his
survey study would have expected their nominal income to be higher if the U.S. had
experienced higher inflation over the last five years. The impact of inflation on wages
is more indirect. Inflation increases the nominal profits of the firm, therefore ceteris
3Most authors use the terms “money illusion” and “inflation illusion” interchangeably. Sometimes
the latter is also used to refer to a situation where households ignore changes in inflation.
4Fisher (1928) provides several interesting examples of inflation illusion due to anchoring. For
example on pages 6-7 he writes about a conversation he had with a German shop woman during the
German hyperinflation period in the 1920s: “That shirt I sold you will cost me just as much to replace
as I am charging you [...] But I have made a profit on that shirt because I bought it for less.”
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paribus it will increase nominal wages. Similarly, the reduction in mortgage rates due
to a decline in expected future inflation expectations is direct, while the fact that it will
also lower future nominal income is indirect. This inattention to indirect eﬀects can
be related to two well known psychological judgement biases: mental accounting and
cognitive dissonance. Mental accounting (Thaler (1980)) is a close cousin of narrow
framing and refers to the phenomenon that people keep track of gains and losses in
diﬀerent mental accounts. By doing so, they overlook the links between them. In our
case, they ignore the fact that higher inflation aﬀects the interest rate of the mortgage
and the labor income growth rate in a symmetric way. Cognitive dissonance and
the self attribution bias might be another reason why individuals do not realize that
inflation increases future nominal income. They have a tendency to attribute increases
in nominal income to their own achievements than simply to higher inflation.5
2.2 Inflation and the Stock Market
Several studies document a negative correlation between nominal stock returns and
inflation — realized and expected (e.g. Lintner (1975), Fama and Schwert (1977),
Gultekin (1983)) and unexpected (Amihud (1996)). This appears puzzling since the
Fisher-relation implies that nominal rates should move one-for-one with expected infla-
tion. One interpretation of these findings is that inflation proxies for future economic
conditions: higher inflation is associated with a grim economic outlook (e.g. Fama
(1981)). On the other hand, it has been argued that the negative correlation might
be due to money illusion. Modigliani and Cohn (1979) claim that prices significantly
depart from fundamentals since investors make two inflation-induced judgement errors:
(i) they tend to capitalize equity earnings at the nominal rate rather than the real rate
and (ii) they fail to realize that firms’ corporate liabilities depreciate in real terms.
Hence, stock prices are too low during high inflation periods. There are a list of papers
that empirically document the impact of money illusion on stock market prices, often
referred to as the “Modigliani-Cohn” hypothesis. Ritter and Warr (2002) document
that the value-price ratio is positively correlated with inflation and that this eﬀect
is more pronounced for leveraged firms. Moreover, they show that inflation and the
value-price ratio are negatively correlated with future market returns. Using Campbell
and Shiller’s (1988) dynamic log-linear valuation method and a subjective proxy for the
equity risk premium, Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) show in the time-series that a
large part of the mispricing in the dividend-price ratio can be explained by inflation il-
lusion.6 In contrast, Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2005) focus on the cross-sectional
5Shiller (1997a) also noted that “Not a single respondent volunteered anywhere on the questionnaire
that he or she benefited from inflation. [...] There was little mention of the fact that inflation
redistributes income from creditors to debtors.”
6Additional evidence on the time-series link between market returns and inflation can be found in
Asness (2000, 2003) and Sharpe (2002).
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implications of money illusion on asset returns and find supportive evidence for the
“Modigliani-Cohn” hypothesis. It is worth emphasizing that proxy eﬀect and money
illusion are not mutually exclusive.
On the other hand, Boudoukh and Richardson (1993) find that at low frequency
nominal market returns are positively correlated with inflation consistently with the
Fisher relation. This finding is not inconsistent with money illusion: even though
investors suﬀering from money illusion underestimate the nominal earnings growth of
companies after an increase in inflation, they should realize their mistake once the
actually nominal earnings are announced.
Basak and Yan (2005) show, within a dynamic asset pricing model, that even though
the utility cost of money illusion (and hence the incentive to monitor real values) is
small, its eﬀect on equilibrium asset prices can be substantial. In the same spirit, Fehr
and Tyran (2001) show that (under strategic complementarity) even if only a small
fraction of individuals suﬀer from money illusion, the aggregate eﬀect can be large.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to empirically assess the link between
money illusion and housing prices.7 We find strong support in favor of money illusion
and weakly supportive evidence for the proxy eﬀect.
It should be emphasized that stock and housing markets diﬀer both in their struc-
ture and their composition. While the residential housing market is dominated by
individual households, institutional investors play a major role in the stock market.
Further, trading frictions, most notably short-sale constraints, severely limit arbitrage
in the residential housing market.
2.3 Borrowing Constraint and Speculation
Tilt eﬀect. Lessard and Modigliani (1975) and Tucker (1975) show that under nom-
inal fixed payment and fixed interest rate mortgages, inflation shifts the real burden of
mortgage payments towards the earlier years of the financing contract. In the presence
of borrowing constraints this limits the size of the mortgages agents can obtain. This
tilt eﬀect could lead to a reduction in housing demand. Kearl (1979) and Follain (1982)
find an empirical link between inflation and housing prices and argue that liquidity con-
straints could rationalize their finding. Wheaton (1985) questions this simple argument
in a life-cycle model and shows that several restrictive assumptions are needed for this
to be the case.
Speculative Trading and Short-Sale Constraints. Borrowing constraints might
also limit the amount of speculation. Harrison and Kreps (1978) show that specula-
tive behavior can arise if agents have diﬀerent opinions, i.e. non-common priors. Said
7Recently Piazzesi and Schneider (2006) argue that disagreement about the inflation level, rather
than the inflation itself, could lead to house price frenzies.
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diﬀerently, even if they could share all the available information, they would still dis-
agree about the likelihood of outcomes. Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) put this model
in a continuous-time setting and show that transaction costs dampen the amount of
speculative trading, but only have limited impact on the size of the bubble. Models of
this type rely on the presence of short-sale constraints — which is a natural constraint
in the housing market — to preempt the ability of rational agents to correct the mis-
pricing. Other factors that limit arbitrage include noise-trader risk (DeLong, Shleifer,
Summers, and Waldmann (1990)) and synchronization risk (Abreu and Brunnermeier
(2003)).
Note also that collateral and downpayment constraints — as analyzed in Stein (1995),
Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996), Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997) — combined with money illusion would lead to an amplification of the
negative eﬀect of inflation on housing prices.
3 Housing Prices and Inflation
We focus on the link between inflation and the price-rent ratio. In principle, an agent
could either buy or rent a house to receive the same service flow. However, renting
and buying a house are not perfect substitutes since households might derive extra
utility from owning a house (e.g. ability to customize the interior, pride of ownership).
Moreover, properties for rent might on average be diﬀerent from properties for sale.8
Nevertheless, long-run movement in the rent level should capture long-run movements
in the service flow. Furthermore, changes in construction cost, demographic changes,
and changes in housing quality should at least in the long-run aﬀect housing prices
and rent symmetrically. As a consequence, in studying mispricing on the housing
market, we focus on the price-rent ratio. Gallin (2004) finds that housing prices and
rents are cointegrated and that the price-rent ratio is a good predictor of future price
and rent changes. Compared to the price-income ratio, the price-rent ratio has the
advantage of being less likely to increase dramatically due to changes in fundamentals
(e.g. in demography or property taxes). Moreover, Gallin (2003) empirically rejects
the hypothesis of cointegration between prices and income using panel-data tests for
cointegration, that have been shown to be more powerful than the time-series analog.
This implies that the commonly used error correction representation of prices and
income would lead to erroneous frequentist inference. Finally, studying the price-rent
ratio is also analogous to the commonly used price-dividend ratio approach to analyze
the mispricing in the stock market.
8The house price index reflects all types of dwellings while rents tend to overweight smaller and
lower quality dwellings. Given that high quality houses fluctuate more over the business cycle, the
data might show a spurious link between inflation, nominal interests rate and the price-rent ratio if
inflation and/or nominal interest rates had a clear business cycle pattern. We address this concern
formally in Section 3.2.2 and show that this does not aﬀect our main findings.
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In this section we show first that a simple non-linear function of the nominal interest
rate is a proxy for the valuation of the price-rent ratio by an agent prone to money
illusion. Empirically, we first document the correlation between nominal variables and
future price-rent ratios. To gain further understanding of this empirical link, we then
decompose the price-rent ratio into a rational component and an implied mispricing
and study its comovements with inflation. In this section we conduct our empirical
analysis focusing on U.K. data because the longer sample period (1966:Q2—2004:Q4)
and the better quality of the data allow us to obtain sharper and more robust inference.
3.1 Housing Prices and Money Illusion - A First-Cut 9
In a dynamic optimization setting the equilibrium real price an agent is willing to pay
for the house, Pt, should be equal to the present discounted value of future real rents,
{Lt}, and the discounted resale value of the house.
Pt = E˜t
"
T−1X
τ=1
mt,t+τLt+τ +mt,TPT
#
where mt,τ is the stochastic discount factor between t and τ > t, T is the time of resale
and E˜t is the expectations operator given agents’ subjective beliefs at time t.
In order to present a first insight into the role of inflation bias, we start by consid-
ering a simple setting without uncertainty and with constant real rent as in Modigliani
and Cohn (1979). In this case, as T → ∞, the equilibrium price-rent ratio for an
economy with rational agents is
Pt
Lt
= Et
" ∞X
τ=1
1
(1 + rt,t+τ)
τ
#
' 1
rt
, (1)
where rt,t+τ is the real (quarterly) risk-free yield from t to τ , rt is the real risk-free
rate, and we assume that limT→∞
³
1
1+rt,T
´T
PT = 0. Equation (1) holds exactly if the
real risk-free rate, rt, is constant.10
9Readers who are familiar with the empirical link between inflation and housing prices can skip
this section without loss of continuity.
10Note that strictly speaking Lt reflects all payoﬀs from owning a house. This includes not only
the service flow from living in the house but also tax benefits, property tax etc. For our empirical
analysis we focus only on the main component: the market price of the service from living in the
house. The standard user cost approach in real estate economics takes the other components into
account as well. The user cost is stated in terms of per dollar of house value. More specifically,
ut = r
f
t + ωt − τ (rmt + πt + ωt) + δt − gt+1 + γt, where r
f
t is the risk-free real interest rate, ωt the
property tax per dollar house value, the third term captures the fact that nominal interest payments
and property tax are deductible form the income tax with marginal tax rate τ , δt reflects maintenance
10
Instead, if the agent suﬀers from money illusion, she treats the (constant) nominal
risk-free yield as real. This implies the inflation biased evaluation
Pt
Lt
= E˜t
" ∞X
τ=1
1
(1 + rt,t+τ)
τ
#
' Et
" ∞X
τ=1
1
(1 + it,t+τ )
τ
#
' 1
it
, (2)
where the first approximation ignores the Jensen’s inequality term and the second
approximation is exact if the nominal interest rate, it, is constant.11 This derivation
parallels the one in Modigliani and Cohn (1979) for the stock market. Equations
(1) and (2) suggest to that 1/it, 1/rt and inflation πt should be used as alternative
regressors to test for money illusion. It is also worth emphasizing that 1/it is highly
non-linear in it for low it — a fact independently emphasized for the real interest rate
by Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai (2005).
To take a first look at the empirical link between inflation, nominal interest rates and
the price-rent ratio, we explore wether it, rt, πt, 1/it and 1/rt have forecasting power for
the price rent ratio. In assessing the forecasting performance of these variables, one faces
several econometric issues. First, Ferson, Sarkissian, and Simin (2002) use a simulation
exercise to argue that the in-sample regression results may be spurious, and both R2
and statistical significance of the regressor are biased upward if both the expected part
of the regressand and the predictive variable are highly persistent (see also Torous,
Valkanov, and Yan (2005)). Therefore, since Pt/Lt is highly persistent, this could lead
to spurious results. Second, in exploring the forecastability of the price-rent ratio, the
choice of the control variables is problematic and to some extent arbitrary since the
literature on housing prices has suggested numerous predictors. Moreover, Poterba
(1991) outlines that the relation between housing prices and forecasting variables often
used in the literature has not been stable across sub-samples.
We address both issues jointly. For the first problem, we remove the persistent
component of the price-rent ratio by constructing the forecasting errors
δˆt+1,t+1−τ =
½
Pt+1/Lt+1 − Eˆt−τ [Pt+1/Lt+1] for τ > 0
Pt+1/Lt+1 for τ = 0
(3)
where τ is the forecasting horizon and Eˆt−τ [Pt/Lt] is the (estimated) persistent compo-
nent of the price-rent ratio and we introduce the convention that for τ = 0, δˆt+1,t+1 =
costs and gt+1 is the capital gain (loss) per dollar of house value, γt is the risk premium. Note that
since nominal mortgage interest payments are income tax deductible, inflation lowers user cost and,
since the price-rent ratio should be equal to the reciprocal of the user cost, this suggests higher house
prices (see Poterba (1984, 1991)). This is exactly the opposite inflation eﬀect of the one caused by
money illusion. A major drawback of the user cost approach is that the house price appreciation is
assumed to be exogenous and is not derived from a consistent dynamic equilibrium. In particular,
by assuming that the price appreciation follows historical patterns, one implicitly assume “irrational”
positive feedback trading phenomena.
11Equation (2) makes clear that money illusion matters independently of whether the mortgage
contract is a flexible rate or a fixed rate one.
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Pt+1/Lt+1. Second, we estimate Eˆt−τ [Pt/Lt] by fitting a reduced form vector auto re-
gressive model (VAR) for Pt/Lt, the log gross return on housing, rh,t, the rent growth
rate ∆lt and the log real return on the twenty-year Government Bonds, rt (constructed
as the nominal rate, it, minus quarterly inflation).12
Following Campbell and Shiller (1988), for small perturbations around the steady
state, the variables included in the VAR should capture most of the relevant information
for the price-rent ratio. Indeed, the R2 of the VAR equation for Pt/Lt is about 99
percent, which is consistent with previous studies that have outlined the high degree
of predictability of housing prices (see, among others, Kearl (1979), Follain (1982)
and Muellbauer and Murphy (1997)). This approach for constructing forecast errors,
δˆt+1,t+1−τ , is parsimonious since it allows us to remove persistency from the dependent
variable without assuming a structural model. It is also conservative since the reduced
form VAR is likely to over-fit the price-rent ratio. We use quarterly data over the
sample period 1966:Q3—2004:Q4. The VAR is estimated with one lag since this is the
optimal lag length suggested by both the Bayesian and Akaike information criteria.
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Figure 3: t-statistics and R2 of univariate regressions of the forecast error δˆt+1,t+1−τ on
interest rates and interest rate reciprocals (both nominal and real) as well as inflation.
12Note that one could alternatively remove the persistent component of the regressors. But doing
this, would add an additional layer of uncertainty since our ability of removing the persistent compo-
nent might change from regressor to regressor. Furthermore, this alternative approach would put too
much emphasis on the last innovation of the regressor.
Also note that we reject that the price-rent ratio is non-stationary consistent with findings in
Gallin (2004). As a consequence, we cannot model Pt/Lt as cointegrated with any of the regressors
considered.
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Figure 3 summarizes the results about the predictability of the price-rent ratio.
The figure plots Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistics (Panel A) and measures
of fit (Panel B) of five univariate regressions of δˆt+1,t+1−τ on rt, it, 1/rt, 1/it and a
smoothed moving average of inflation, πt.13 (Recall that we introduced the convention
that for τ = 0, δˆt+1,t+1 = Pt+1/Lt+1). That is, the first point in each of the plotted
series corresponds to the regression output of a standard forecasting regression for the
price-rent ratio.
Focusing first on τ = 0 — the standard forecasting regression — it is apparent that
the real interest rate, r, has no forecasting power for the price-rent ratio with a t-
statistic (Panel A) of 0.741 and a R2 (Panel B) of about 0 percent. This is consistent
with the finding of Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) that the real interest rate has no
explanatory power for movements in the real price of residential housing. The sign
of the slope coeﬃcient of the nominal interest rate, i, is negative suggesting that an
increase in the nominal interest rate reduces the price-rent ratio. The regressor is
statistically significant only at the 10 percent level and explains about 5 percent of
the variation in the price-rent ratio. The figure also shows that lagged inflation is a
significant predictor of the price-rent ratio and that the estimated slope coeﬃcient has
a negative sign, which is consistent with the Modigliani and Cohn (1979) argument
that inflation causes a negative mispricing in assets. This is also consistent with the
findings of Kearl (1979) and Follain (1982) that housing demand is reduced by greater
inflation. The regressor explains about 7 percent of the time variation in Pt/Lt. From
the predictive regression of the price-rent ratio on 1/rt — as suggested by equation (1) —
we learn that this variable is not significant nor has any forecasting power for the future
price-rent ratio, reinforcing the conjecture that housing prices do not tend to respond
to changes in the real interest rate. However, the reciprocal of the nominal interest
rate, 1/it, is highly statistically significant and has a positive sign implying that the
price-rent ratio tends to comove with the valuation of agents prone to money illusion.
Moreover, this regressor is able to explain about 9 percent of the time variation in
the price-rent ratio. Consistently with money illusion, inflation πt shows a significant
negative correlation with housing prices.
Focusing on τ > 0, we can assess whether the regressors considered have forecasting
power for the unexpected component of price-rent changes.14 It is clear from Figure 3
that the real interest rate (both in terms of r and 1/r) generally has no explanatory
power for the unexpected movements in the price-rent ratio. To the contrary, the
nominal interest rate, inflation and the reciprocal of the nominal interest rate are
statistically significant forecasting variables of unexpected movements in the price-rent
13Note that the measure of inflation we use is the CPI index without housing. The smoothing
window is of sixteen quarters and we take .9 as smoothing parameter.
14Recall that if the results obtained with τ = 0 are due to the persistence of regressors and regres-
sand, we would expect the statistical significance of the regressors to be substantially reduced when
considering τ > 0.
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ratio, and explain a substantial share of the time series variation of this variable.
For robustness we check our results using the real interest rate implied by the yields
on inflation protected ten year government bonds, instead of using nominal interest rate
minus inflation, and using the implied inflation instead of our smoothed inflation. Un-
fortunately, this data is available only since 1982:Q1. Consistently with the previous
results, we find that this measure of the real interest rate also has no explanatory power
for the price rent ratio: the regressor is not statistically significant for any horizon τ
and its point estimate changes sign at some horizons. Moreover, using implied infla-
tion instead of smoothed inflation we obtain similar patterns as in Figure 3. The only
diﬀerence is that implied inflation is not statistically significant at two horizon levels,
τ = 1 and 2; this is likely to be due to the fact that we lose 16 years of quarterly data
using implied inflation. Similarly, the real yield spread does not seem to matter. We
define the real yield spread as the ten year real interest rate from inflation protected
Government bonds minus the three month Government bills reduced by current in-
flation. Moreover, estimated real interest rate variability and inflation variability are
generally not significant predictors of the price-rent ratio, but nevertheless add (very
little) explanatory power when considered jointly with inflation. The nominal yield
spread seems to matter, but this might be spurious since its predictive power goes
away when we control for the persistent component of the price-rent ratio. Finally, the
default spread, defined as the diﬀerence in yield between the Great Britain Corporate
Bond Yield and the ten year Government bond, has predictive power.15 Nevertheless,
the default spread does not substantially reduce the statistical significance of our main
nominal regressors (πt, 1/it and it).
Case and Shiller (1989, 1990) find that housing price changes are predictable and
argue that this might be at odds with market eﬃciency. To check whether this potential
departure from market eﬃciency is connected with money illusion, we test whether
lagged inflation and the reciprocals of the nominal and real interest rates help to predict
the first diﬀerence of the price-rent ratio. We find that (i) lagged inflation and nominal
interest rates explain 6 to 10 percent of the time series variation of the changes in the
price-rent ratio, (ii) these regressors are statistically significant at levels between one
and five percent, (iii) the estimated signs are consistent with money illusion, and (iv)
the real interest rate does not have any predictive power for changes in the price-rent
ratio.
Of course, our results only show that the implicit stochastic discount factor is
related to inflation. That is, the forecastability of the price-rent ratio could also be due
to predictable changes in the required risk-premium. This would be rational, hence it
doesn’t need to be caused by money illusion. We disentangle the role of money illusion
in the next subsection.
15We use the corporate default spread as a proxy for the credit market condition. Ideally, one would
like to use the spread between mortgage rates and Government Bond Yields, but this is not feasible
due to data limitations.
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3.2 Decomposing the Inflation Eﬀect
Inflation can aﬀect the price-rent ratio for rational reasons. In this subsection we
diﬀerentiate the rational eﬀects of inflation on the price-rent ratio — through expected
future rent growth rates and expected future returns on housing — from the eﬀect of
inflation on the mispricing.
3.2.1 Methodology
We follow the Campbell and Shiller (1988) methodology, but allow agents to have
subjective beliefs. Letting P be the price of housing and L be the rental payment, the
gross return on housing, Rh, is given by the following accounting identity:
Rh,t+1 =
Pt+1 + Lt+1
Pt
.
Following Campbell and Shiller (1988), we log-linearize this relation around the steady
state but, given our focus on mispricing, we allow traders to have a probability measure
for the underlying stochastic process that is diﬀerent from the objective one. As a
consequence, the steady state depends on the underlying measure of the traders. Under
the assumption that the price-rent ratio is stationary, we can log-linearize the last
equation as
rh,t+1 = (1− ρ) k + ρ (pt+1 − lt+1)− (pt − lt) +∆lt+1,
where rh,t := logRh,t, pt := logPt, lt := logLt, ∆lt := lt− lt−1, ρ := 1/
¡
1 + exp(l − p)
¢
,
l − p is the long run average rent-price ratio, and k is a constant. The log price-rent
ratio can be therefore rewritten (disregarding a constant term) as a linear combination
of future rent growth, future returns on housing and a terminal value
pt − lt = lim
T→∞
"
TX
τ=1
ρτ−1 (∆lt+τ − rh,t+τ) + ρT (pt+T − lt+T )
#
. (4)
Moving to excess rent growth rates, ∆let+τ = ∆lt− rt, and excess returns (risk premia)
on housing, reh,t = rh,t − rt, where rt is the real return on the long-term government
bond (with maturity of 10 or 20 years), the price-rent ratio can be expressed as
pt − lt =
∞X
τ=1
ρτ−1
£
∆let+τ − reh,t+τ
¤
+ lim
T→∞
ρT (pt+T − lt+T ) . (5)
This equality also has to hold for any realization and hence, holds in expectation for
any measure.
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ψ—Mispricing Measure. Note that if agents are not fully rational, the observed
price will deviate from the true “fundamental value” and hence the realized excess
returns reh,t+τ are also distorted. Taking expectations and assuming that the transver-
sality conditions hold, yields
pt − lt =
∞X
τ=1
ρτ−1Et
£
∆let+τ
¤
−
∞X
τ=1
ρτ−1Et
£
reh,t+τ
¤
=
∞X
τ=1
ρτ−1E˜t
£
∆let+τ
¤
−
∞X
τ=1
ρτ−1E˜t
£
reh,t+τ
¤
where Et is the objective expectation operator conditional on the information available
at time t and E˜t denotes investors’ subjective (and potentially distorted) expectation.
Adding and substracting
P∞
τ=1 ρ
τ−1E
£
∆let+τ
¤
from the second equation yields
pt − lt =
∞X
τ=1
ρτ−1E
£
∆let+τ
¤
−
∞X
τ=1
ρτ−1E˜t
£
reh,t+τ
¤
+
∞X
τ=1
ρτ−1
³
E˜t − Et
´ £
∆let+τ
¤
| {z }
=:ψt
, (6)
where we use the convention
³
E˜t −Et
´
[x] := E˜t [x] − Et [x] and where ψt represents
the mispricing due to a distortion of beliefs about the future rent growth rate. If
subjective and objective expectation were to coincide, ψt would be zero. Note also
that ψt = −
P∞
τ=1 ρ
τ−1
³
E˜t −Et
´ £
reh,t+τ
¤
.
So far our analysis applies to any form of belief distortion and is not specific to
money illusion. In order to see how our definition of mispricing can capture money
illusion, let’s consider the following example: as in Modigliani and Cohn (1979) indi-
viduals fail to distinguish between nominal and real rates of returns. They mistakenly
attribute a decrease (increase) in inflation πt to a decline (increase) in real returns, rh,t
— or equivalently ignore that a decrease in inflation also lowers nominal rent growth
rate (∆lt + πt), i.e. E˜t [∆lt+τ ] = Et [∆lt+τ − πt+τ ]. Therefore, our mispricing measure
reduces to
ψt = −
∞X
τ=1
ρτ−1Et [πt+τ ] . (7)
That is, the mispricing and hence the price-rent ratio are increasing as expected infla-
tion declines. Note that in this particular case money illusion always causes a negative
mispricing error. However, if individuals have a reference level of inflation, say π¯, this
is not necessarily true. In this case the last equation becomes
ψt = −
∞X
τ=1
ρτ−1Et [πt+τ − π¯] . (8)
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Even though the level of mispricing is diﬀerent with a reference level of inflation, its
correlation with inflation is unchanged.
To construct the empirical counterpart of ψt we follow Campbell (1991) and com-
pute the objective expectations of rent growth rates using a reduced form VAR. The
variables included in the VAR are the log excess return on housing, reh,t, the log price-
rent ratio, pt − lt, the excess rent growth rate, ∆let , and the exponentially smoothed
moving average of inflation, πt. The VAR is estimated using quarterly data and the
chosen lag length is one (both the Bayesian and the Akaike information criteria pre-
fer this lag length for the estimated model). We obtain the empirical counterpart ofP∞
τ=1 ρ
τ−1Et
£
reh,t+τ
¤
by subtracting estimated expected rent growth terms from the log
price-rent ratio.
The problem is that we do not observe E˜t
£
reh,t+τ
¤
. We follow Campbell and
Vuolteenaho (2004) and assume that E˜t
£
reh,t+τ
¤
is governed by a set of risk-factors
λt. Hence, we can write
P∞
τ=1 ρ
τ−1E˜t
£
reh,t+τ
¤
= a + b1λt + ξt. In order to determineP∞
τ=1 ρ
τ−1E˜t
£
reh,t+τ
¤
−
P∞
τ=1 ρ
τ−1Et
£
reh,t+τ
¤
, we run an OLS of
P∞
τ=1 ρ
τ−1Et
£
reh,t+τ
¤
on
the risk-factors λt.
∞X
τ=1
ρτ−1Et
£
reh,t+τ
¤
= a+ b1λt + ξt| {z }
=
?∞
τ=1 ρτ−1E˜t[reh,t+τ ]
+ ψt. (9)
We use diﬀerent potential risk-factors. As suggested in Campbell and Vuolteenaho
(2004) we use as first risk proxy the conditional volatility of an investment that is long
on housing market and short on the 10 years government bonds. That is, we construct
ψˆt as the OLS residual of the following linear regression
\P∞
τ=1 ρτ−1Et
£
reh,t+τ
¤
= αˆ+
8X
τ=0
bˆτ hˆt−τ + ψˆt, (10)
where the first term is constructed as \
P∞
τ=1 ρτ−1Et
£
reh,t+τ
¤
:= (pt − lt)−
P∞
τ=1 ρ
τ−1Eˆt
£
∆let+τ
¤
with Eˆt
£
∆ret+τ
¤
being the τ -steps ahead VAR forecasts conditional on the data observed
up to time t. The regressors hˆt−τ includes seven lagged GARCH-estimates of the con-
ditional volatility16 and a lagged VAR forecast of the left hand side variable. The latter
acts as a control in attempt to remove ξt from the residual ψˆt. By doing so, we take
a conservative approach in order not to overestimate the mispricing. We also report
results using only seven lagged GARCH-estimates of the conditional volatility, denoted
by ψˆ
0
t.
Note that if an individual never sells her house, she is not exposed to any housing
market risk except a potential reduction in borrowing capacity. The risk comes about
16The fitted model is a ARCH-GARCH(2,2) with an AR(1) component for the mean to take into
account the persistence in housing returns.
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only whenever she has to buy or sell a house. This is for example the case when she
has to move between areas with diﬀerent house price levels. Hence, an interaction
between the probability of moving and cross-regional variability of house prices is a
natural candidate for a risk factor. We therefore introduce a proxy for this source of
risk among the risk-factors λt. This is done by adding three additional regressors in
Equation (10): the cross-regional price variability across the main 14 macro regions
of the U.K., the total within country migration normalized by total population, and
the interaction between these two variables. We denote the corresponding mispricing
measure by ψˆ
00
t . Finally, we also experimented with the canonical Fama-French risk
factors.
Some note of caution is appropriate about this decomposition. First, the measure
of mispricing ψt can depend crucially on the chosen subjective risk factor λt — which is
arbitrary. Second, for the OLS construction in Equation (10) to be correct, λt should
be orthogonal to ψt. Third, in deriving our ψ-mispricing we also assume that irrational
investors understand the iterated accounting identity in equation (4).
In order to determine the link between the mispricing and inflation we regress the
empirical counterpart of ψt on a set of variables meant to capture the impact of money
illusion on the mispricing: πt, it, log (1/it).
ε—Mispricing Measure. To derive the ψ-mispricing we assumed that the transver-
sality condition holds under both the objective and the subjective measure. We now
relax this assumption and allow for explosive paths. Moreover, we avoid having to
specify exogenous risk factors, λ, to identify the implied mispricing due to explosive
paths.
We define a new measure of mispricing, εt, that under the null hypothesis of ratio-
nal pricing should be zero or at least orthogonal to proxies for money illusion. This
mispricing captures the diﬀerence in expectations about future excess rent growth rates
and housing investment risk premia plus E˜t
£
limT→∞ ρT (pt+T − lt+T )
¤
:
εt :=
∞X
τ=1
ρτ−1
³
E˜t −Et
´ £
∆let+τ − reh,t+τ
¤
+ E˜t
h
lim
T→∞
ρT (pt+T − lt+T )
i
. (11)
That is, εt is the diﬀerence between observed log price-rent ratio and the log price-
rent ratio that would prevail if (i) all agents were computing expectations under the
objective measure and (ii) the transversality condition under the objective measure
holds, i.e. Et
£
limT→∞ ρT (pt+T − lt+T )
¤
= 0.
The ε-mispricing can be expressed as a violation of the transversality condition
under the objective measure
pt − lt =
∞X
τ=1
ρτ−1Et
£
∆let+τ − reh,t+τ
¤
+Et
h
lim
T→∞
ρT (pt+T − lt+T )
i
| {z }
=εt
.
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To see this, take subjective expectation of equation (5) and subtract the above equation
from it. Therefore, the ε-mispricing captures bubbles which are due to potentially
exploding paths, including the intrinsic bubbles analyzed in Froot and Obstfeld (1991).
The price patterns depicted in Figure 1 make it diﬃcult to rule out a priori explosive
paths over certain subsamples. That is, imposing the objective transversality condition
might be too strong an assumption. Explosive path might occur if for example agents
fail to understand that all the future realizations of returns and rent growth rates must
map into the current price-rent ratio as Equation (4) implies. Note that we assume that
all traders have the same subjective measure. If traders have heterogeneous measures
and face short-sale constraints (as for example in Harrison and Kreps (1978)), εt could
also be aﬀected by a speculative component.
To see how the ε-mispricing relates to money illusion consider, as we did for the
ψ-mispricing, the Modigliani and Cohn (1979) benchmark. In this case we obtain the
same result as in Equation (7) and (8) with ψt replaced by εt. That is, money illusion
implies a negative correlation between the ε-mispricing and πt, it, and − log (1/it).
To estimate this mispricing we decompose the observed log price-rent ratio into
three components: the implied pricing error, εˆt, the discounted expected future rent
growth, and the discounted expected future returns
pt − lt =
∞X
τ=1
ρτ−1Eˆt
£
∆let+τ
¤
−
∞X
τ=1
ρτ−1Eˆt
£
reh,t+τ
¤
+ εˆt, (12)
where Eˆt denotes conditional expectations computed using the estimated VAR de-
scribed above, that is, Eˆt
£
∆let+τ
¤
and Eˆt
£
∆det+τ
¤
are the τ -steps ahead VAR forecasts
conditional on the data observed up to time t.
3.2.2 Empirical Evidence
In this subsection we focus on the empirical links between mispricing measures and
inflation. Our first-cut analysis in Section 3.1 showed that nominal terms covary with
price-rent ratio rather than real terms. But this link might be due to rational chan-
nels, frictions or money illusion. There are several rational channels through which
inflation could aﬀect housing prices. First, if inflation damages the real economy,P∞
τ=1 ρ
τ−1Et
£
∆let+τ
¤
should be negatively related with inflation. For example, this
could be the case of stagflation caused by a cost-push shock. Second,
P∞
τ=1 ρ
τ−1Et [rh,t+τ ]
could tend to rise if inflation makes the economy riskier (or investors more risk averse),
therefore driving up the required excess return on housing investment. If any of these
were the case, the negative correlation between price-rent ratio and inflation could sim-
ply be the outcome of negative real eﬀects of inflation or of time varying risk premia
on the housing investment.
Most importantly, if there were no inflation illusion, we would expect our mispricing
measures to be uncorrelated with πt, log (1/it), and it. Instead, the Modigliani and
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Cohn (1979) hypothesis of money illusion would predict a negative correlation between
our mispricing measures and inflation (and the nominal interest rate), and a positive
correlation between the mispricing and log (1/it).
Table 1 Panel A reports the regression output of the three components of the log
price-rent ratio in Equation (6), on the exponentially smoothed moving average of
inflation, πt, the nominal interest rate, it, and the log of its reciprocal, log (1/it).
Dependent Variables: Regressors:
πt it log (1/it)
Slope coeﬀ. R2 Slope coeﬀ. R2 Slope coeﬀ. R2
Panel A:
ψˆt −4.09
(13.479)
.83 −6.80
(11.765)
.74 .136
(8.020)
.69
∞P
τ=1
ρτ−1Eˆt∆let+τ −2.58
(2.390)
.12 −3.96
(1.938)
.09 .093
(2.083)
.12
−
∞P
τ=1
ρτ−1E˜treh,t+τ 1.92
(1.066)
.03 3.60
(.931)
.03 −.050
(.595)
.02
Panel B:
ψˆ
0
t −6.15
(2.483)
.17 −10.9
(2.668)
.17 .241
(2.823)
.19
ψˆ
00
t −2.60
(4.812)
.53 −4.79
(5.898)
.55 .092
(4.825)
.49
εˆt −3.90
(7.946)
.65 −6.30
(6.927)
.55 .129
(5.991)
.52
Table 1: Univariate Regressions on inflation, nominal interest rate and illusion proxy.
Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistics in brackets.
The first row of Table 1 Panel A reports the univariate regression output of regress-
ing the pricing errors on the proxies that are meant to capture inflation illusion. All
the regressors are highly statistically significant and the estimated signs are the one
we would expect under money illusion: the mispricing of the price-rent ratio tends to
rise as inflation and nominal interest rates decrease and log (1/it) rises. Moreover, our
proxies for inflation bias are able to explain between 69 percent and 83 percent of the
time series variation of the mispricing of the price-rent ratio. Fitted values computed
using inflation are plotted versus the observed values of ψˆt in Figure 2 in the introduc-
tion. The figure makes clear is that the high explanatory power of inflation is not due
to a particular subsample.
Ideally, we would like to regress ψˆt on the objective expectation of future inflation.
One way to capture variations in expected inflation is to use the series of implied
inflation from the inflation protected ten year government bonds. Using this measure
as explanator of ψˆt we obtain an R2 of .51 percent and a point estimate for the slope
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coeﬃcient of −5.06 with a t−statistics of 4.864.17
The second row shows that expected future real rent growth rates seem to be nega-
tively correlated with inflation and nominal interest rate (this last variable is significant
only at the 10 percent level), and positively correlated with log (1/it). Nevertheless,
only a small share (between 9 percent and 12 percent) of the time variation in expected
rent growth are explained by the regressors considered. These results are consistent
with a view in which inflation influences the rent to price ratio partially due to the fact
that high inflation seems to proxy for a worsening of future economic conditions (see
e.g. Fama (1981)). On the other hand, this could simply be the outcome of housing
rents being more sticky than the general price level.
The third row outlines that there is no significant link between inflation and (sub-
jectively expected) risk premia on the housing investment. The regressors considered
are not statistically significant and explain only between 2 percent and 4 percent of the
time series variation in expected future returns on housing. Moreover, the estimated
signs of the regressors imply that inflation is associated with a lower risk premium on
housing investment, i.e. in times of high inflation the housing investment is considered
to be relatively less risky than investing in long-horizon government bonds. Since we
use a before-tax measure of returns on housing, this result could also be due to the
fact that an increase in inflation increases the after-tax return on housing (see Poterba
(1984)), therefore requiring a lower before-tax risk premium.
The sum of the slope coeﬃcients associated with each of the regressors in Table
1 Panel A is an estimate of the elasticity of the price-rent ratio with respect to that
regressor. Our results therefore imply that, on average, a one percent increase in
inflation (nominal interest rate) maps into a 4.75 (7.16) percent decrease in the price
of housing relative to rent, and that the largest contribution to this negative elasticity
is given by the eﬀect of inflation (nominal interest rate) on the mispricing
Panel B of Table 1 reports the regression coeﬃcients for alternative measures of
mispricings. Recall that: ψ0t is the mispricing constructed without adding controls in
Equation (10)18; ψ00t is the mispricing constructed adding our “moving risk factors”;
and that εt is the mispricing constructed without specifying exogenous risk factors
and measures the mispricing that maps into a violation of the transversality condition
under the objective measure. Note that due to data limitations the ψ00t -time series
starts only in 1975:Q1 while the time series of the other mispricing measures run from
1966:Q3—2004:Q4.
The first thing of interest is to compare the sizes of the mispricing of ψ and ψ0.
Figure 4 plots the price-rent ratio, and both ψ-mispricing measures over our sample
period.
First, notice that the measures of mispricing generally have the right pattern of
17Note that in this case, due to data availability problems, we use a sample starting in 1982:Q1.
18We also tried as alternative risk factors the canonical Fama-French risk factors and obtained
similar results as for the covariance of ψˆ
0
t and the money illusing proxies.
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Figure 4: Price-rent ratio and mispricing measures
correlation with the price-rent ratio. Second, the ψ-mispricing and ε-mispricing capture
a non-negligible fraction of the variation in the price-rent ratio. Third, as argued in
the methodological section, the ψ0-mispricing measure seems to attribute too large a
fraction of the movements in the price-rent ratio to the mispricing. The ψ00-mispricing
measure (not depicted), available over the shorter sample 1975:Q1-2004:Q4, closely
tracks the ψ and ε-mispricings.
Next, we analyze the explanatory power of the inflation illusion proxies for the ψ0-
mispricing and the ε-mispricing. The first row of Panel B of Table 1 shows that both
ψˆ
0
t and ψˆ
00
t — as inflation illusion would imply — covaries negatively (and significantly)
with inflation πt. Similarly, the univariate regressions with nominal interest rate it
and log (1/it) also deliver significant results consistent with money illusion. Overall,
the explanatory power of the inflation illusion proxies is reduced for the ψ0-mispricing.
This is not surprising since ψˆ
0
t in Figure 4 seems to overstate the time-variation of
the mispricing. There is also a small reduction in the measure for the ψ00-mispricing
(second row of Panel B), but this might be partially due to the diﬀerent sample period.
The third row of Panel B of Table 1 reports the regression coeﬃcient of the ε-
mispricing on proxies of money illusion. Once again, the signs are consistent with
money illusion. Moreover, the estimated elasticities are fairly close to the ones obtained
using ψˆt. Note that theoretically the ε-mispricing could follow a martingale process.
Hence, for robustness we also regress the first diﬀerence of ε on inflation. The estimated
regression coeﬃcient is −4.02 with a standard error of 7.459 and an R2 of 31 percent.
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One worry might be that credit standards might vary over time in response to
overall economic conditions, and that this mechanism might generate the link between
mispricing and inflation we find in the data. This is potentially important since we
have already oberved in Section 3.1 that there is a statistically significant link between
price-rent movements and the default spread (which is meant to capture the overall
economic condition of the credit market). To assess the relevance of time-variation
of credit market conditions, we regress our mispricing measures on inflation and the
default spread jointly. We find that for all the measures of mispricing default spread
is not statistically significant after controlling for inflation and that the measures of fit
do not increase by more than 1 percent.
Next, the mispricing might be linked to the volatitilty of inflation more than the
level itself. We check this hypothesis by running multivariate regressions of our mispric-
ing measures on inflation and an estimate of conditional inflation volatility.19 We find
that the conditional volatility of inflation has no explanatory power for both mispricing
measures after controlling for the level of inflation.
Overall, the results in Table 1 suggest that money illusion can explain a large share
of the mispricing in the housing market and that the negative correlation between
inflation and the rent-price ratio is mainly due to the eﬀect of money illusion on the
mispricing. Nevertheless, our findings could be rationalized by some forms of market
frictions. Section 4 addresses this alternative hypotheses formally.
3.2.3 Robustness Analysis
Assessing Uncertainty. To assess the robustness of these results, we next consider
the uncertainty due to the fact that we do not directly observe expected rent growth
rates and expected future returns on housing, but instead we use the estimated VAR
to construct their proxies.
Under a diﬀuse prior, the posterior distribution of the estimated VAR can be fac-
torized as the product of an inverse Wishart and, conditional on the covariance matrix,
a multivariate normal distribution
β|Σ ∼ N
³
βˆ,Σ⊗ (X 0X)−1
´
Σ−1 ∼ Wishart
µ³
nΣˆ
´−1
, n−m
¶
where β is the vector of slope coeﬃcients in the VAR system, Σ is the covariance
matrix of the residuals, the variables with a hat denote the corresponding estimates,
X is the matrix of regressors, n is the sample size and m is the number of estimated
parameters (see Zellner (1971), Schervish (1995) and Bauwens, Lubrano, and Richard
19The fitted model is a ARCH-GARCH(1,2) with an AR(1) component for the mean and quarterly
dummies to take into account potential seasonality.
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(1999)).20 To assess the robustness of the results in Section 3.2.2 we compute 10,000
draws from the posterior distribution of the VAR coeﬃcients and, for each draw, we
construct expected excess returns, expected rent growth rates and implied mispricing,
and use this variables to repeat the regressions reported in the previous section (the
procedure is described in detail in Appendix A.2). Table 2 reports the results of this
Monte Carlo exercise.
DepVar: Regressors:
πt it log (1/it)
coeﬀ. R2 coeﬀ. R2 coeﬀ. R2
Panel A:
ψˆt −3.10
[−7.79, −.185]
.61
[.03, .92]
−5.28
[−12.63, −.25]
.57
[.04, .78]
.107
[.01, .25]
.54
[.04, .71]
∞P
τ=1
ρτ−1Eˆt∆let+τ −2.6
[−11.8, 9.08]
.27
[0, .85]
−4.01
[−18.1, 13.9]
.20
[0, .64]
.095
[−.303, .392]
.21
[0, .58]
−
∞P
τ=1
ρτ−1E˜treh,t+τ 1.81
[−10.41, 9.61]
.10
[0, .64]
3.44
[−15.34, 15.43]
.09
[0, .59]
−.048
[−.328, .286]
.07
[0, .44]
Panel B:
εˆt −3.9
[−11.1, −.185]
.64
[.05, .94]
−6.28
[−17.4, −.68]
.54
[.05, .75]
.129
[.01, .372]
.52
[.05, .67]
Table 2: Median and 95 percent confidence intervals for slope coeﬃcients and R2.
Each row of the table reports the median slope coeﬃcient associated with the
regressor, the medianR2 and (in squared brackets) their 95 percent confidence intervals.
The first row of Panel A of Table 2 shows that the relation between inflation illusion
and the mispricing of the rent-price ratio is a robust one: inflation and nominal interest
rate show a significantly negative correlation with the mispricing while the inflation-
biased valuation shows a significantly positive correlation. Moreover, even though
the distribution of the estimated R2 has a heavy left tail, there seems to be a very
high posterior probability that these variables explain a large share of the time series
variation in the mispricing. The second and third row of Panel A of Table 2 show
instead that there is substantial uncertainty about the correlation between inflation,
nominal interest rate and expected future returns on housing and expected future rent
growth rates. Overall, these results confirm an empirically strong link between nominal
values and the mispricing of the housing market, and suggest that this mechanism is
the main source of the negative correlation between the price-rent ratio and inflation
and the nominal interest rate.
Note that these results are conditional on the estimated risk-factor λt. The reason
being that the uncertainty about λt hinges more upon what the risk-factor should be
20This result is exact under normality and the Jeﬀrey’s prior f (β,Σ) ∝ |Σ|−(p+1)/2 (where p is the
number of left hand side variables), but can also be obtained, under mild regularity conditions, as an
asymptotic approximation around the posterior MLE.
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than upon how it is estimated. To address this we perform a similar robustness exercise
using the ε-mispricing — that does not depend on exogenous risk-factors. These results
are reported in Panel B of Table 2 and — as in Panel A — are very similar to the ones
in Table 1.
Assessing the Role of the Business Cycle. Unlike the price-dividend ratio in the
stock market, the observed price-rent ratio is a less precise measure since the housing
price index reflects all types of dwellings while the rent index tends to overweight
smaller and lower quality dwellings.
The prices of high quality houses appreciate at a higher rate during booms, and
depreciate more during recessions, than cheaper houses do (see, among others, Poterba
(1991) and Earley (1996)). This might cause the measured price-rent ratio to comove
with the business cycle. Hence, if inflation and the nominal interest rate had a clear
business cycle pattern, our estimated mispricing measures could show a spurious cor-
relation with these variables.
Figure 8 in Appendix A.3 plots the time series of the U.K. exponentially smoothed
quarterly inflation, the return on the twenty-year Government Bonds, and the Hodrick
and Prescott (1997) filtered estimate of the GDP business cycle. The figure shows that
there is no strong contemporaneous correlation of inflation and nominal interest rates
with the business cycle (the correlation coeﬃcients are −.16 and −.15 respectively).
This suggests that the high degree of explanatory power that inflation and the nominal
interest rate have for the housing market mispricing is unlikely to be due to the comove-
ment of these variables with the business cycle. In Appendix A.3 we address this issue
formally, and we find that the inclusion of the business cycle in the OLS regressions
for the mispricing measures (i) does not drive out the statistical significance of πt, it
and log (1/it), (ii) does not significantly change the point estimates of the elasticities
of the mispricing reported in Table 1, (iii) does not significantly increase our ability to
explain the time variation in the mispricing, (iv) and that the business cycle alone has
very little (in the case of ψˆt and εˆt) or no (in the case of ψˆ
0
t) explanatory power for the
mispricing measures.
4 Market Frictions
The previous section documents a strong link between mispricings in the housing mar-
ket and inflation, and suggest money illusion as the driving mechanism of this rela-
tionship. However, a potential alternative explanation of this finding is the presence
of housing market frictions. In this section we formally investigate this competing
hypothesis.
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4.1 Tilt Eﬀect
Our empirical results are consistent with money illusion. Nevertheless, we could be
capturing the tilt eﬀect of inflation which potentially generates a negative relationship
between inflation and housing prices. The tilt eﬀect refers to a particular form of
liquidity constraint. It is best understood by comparing the real repayment profiles of
a mortgage with and without inflation. Suppose agents can only enter fixed nominal
repayment mortgages. The real repayment profiles of such a contract are depicted in
Figure 5 for a zero and a positive inflation environment.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
0.5
1.0
t years
Figure 5: Real mortgage payments over time in a zero inflation environment (dashed
line) and 5 percent inflation environment (solid curve).
Without inflation the real mortgage payments are constant, while in an inflationary
environment the real mortgage payments decrease over time. In order to keep the real
net present value the same in the two environments, the initial payments have to be
higher in a world with non-zero inflation. That is, the real repayment profile is tilted
towards the earlier periods. In other words, when inflation is high, the financial burden
is “front-loaded” and the mortgage-payment to income ratio is higher in the early years
of the mortgage. Hence, liquidity constraints are more likely to bind and agents are less
able to leverage. In turn, a more binding constraint in the first period of the mortgage
depresses housing demand and prices. Note that if liquidity constraint were to be
binding for a large set of agents, we would expect the price-rent, and the mispricing
measures, to be linked to movements in the real interest rate — we have seen in previous
sections that this is not the case.
To test whether the tilt eﬀect drives our results we perform two types of tests.
First, note that the intercept of the repayment scheme is proportional to the nominal
interest rate, i, and that it is related to inflation only insofar as it aﬀects the nominal
interest rate. That is, once one controls for the nominal interest rate, inflation should
not matter if the tilt eﬀect is the driving force of our results. On the other hand, if the
mispricing is driven by money illusion, it should be related to inflation π as stressed
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in Equation (7).21 Therefore, we regress our benchmark mispricing measures, ψt and
ε, jointly on inflation and the nominal interest rate (both in levels and in logs). If
the mispricing is driven by the tilt eﬀect, inflation π should not play any role after
controlling for the nominal interest rate i. This hypothesis is clearly rejected as shown
in Table 3.
DepVar: Regressors:
πt it log (it) R¯2
ψˆt −3.13
(6.395)
−2.02
(2.096)
.85
ψˆt −3.30
(7.467)
−.038
(2.109)
.85
εˆt −3.27
(3.498)
−1.27
(.6548)
.65
εˆt −3.15
(3.616)
−.034
(.9055)
.66
Table 3: Regression coeﬃcients and Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistics in
brackets.
The first row reports the multivariate regression of the ψ-mispricing on inflation
and the nominal interest rate. The inclusion of the interest rate does not drive out the
statistical significance of π and it increases the measure of fit by a mere two percent (see
Table 1). Note also that inflation is highly statistically significant while the interest
rate is only significant at the 5 percent level. The second row uses log (it) instead of it
and delivers almost identical results. The third and the fourth row use the ε-mispricing.
In both cases inflation is highly statistically significant after controlling for the interest
rate. Furthermore, both it and log (it) are not statistically significant and the inclusion
of these regressors increase the measures of fit by no more than one percent.
These results reject the null that our key findings are simply capturing the tilt
eﬀect. Nevertheless, they could be due to a subset of the observations in our sample.
To check for this we perform the same exercise as reported in Table 3 using a rolling
window with size equal to a third of the full sample.
Panel A and Panel B depict the estimated regression coeﬃcients and 95 percent
confidence intervals of multi-variate regression of the ψ-mispricing on inflation πt and
the log of the nominal interest rate, log (it). The second row reports the same analysis
for the ε-mispricing. The point estimates are reported at the date of the last obser-
vation of the rolling sample (of 52 quarterly observations) — e.g. the point estimates
corresponding to 1982:Q1 uses data from 1969:Q2 to 1982:Q1. Inflation is always sig-
nificant, while log (it) is generally not statistically significant for the ψ-mispricing and
never significant for the ε-mispricing. Moreover, the weak statistical significance of
log (it) in explaining the ψ-mispricing over the whole sample (Table 3) appears to be
21If agents suﬀer from money illusion, the price-rent ratio comoves with the nominal interest rate,
i (see Section 3.1) while, as pointed out in Section 3.2, the misspricing comoves with inflation, π.
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Figure 6: Multivariate regression of mispricing measures on inflation, π, and log interest
rate, log (i), over rolling samples.
driven by the last 4 years of data. This last point is confirmed by an expanding window
regression exercise (not reported here). Furthermore, the same qualitative results were
obtained using the level of the nominal interest rate, it instead of log (it).
Second, we now present an alternative test to discriminate between the money
illusion and the tilt-eﬀect hypotheses based on the evolution of the mortgage market
over time. Note that in our example the tilt eﬀect arises since the nominal mortgage
payments are constant, but more flexible mortgage contracts might reduce or eliminate
it. Indeed, in the real world, agents can use multiple alternative financing schemes
available on the market that are not aﬀected by the tilt eﬀect. For example this is the
case for flexible interest rate mortgages, price level adjusted mortgages (PLAM) or the
graduate payment mortgages (GPM).22 This is especially true in the United Kingdom,
where PLAM and GPM were available at least since the early 1970’s. Furthermore,
new, more flexible, mortgage products were introduced over the years in all major
22On the other hand, Spiegel (2001) provides a rationale for endogenous credit rationing in the
housing market due to moral hazard.
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countries. In the U.S. for example, interest only mortgages, which substantially lower
the initial payments, have become very popular in recent years.23 Hence, we would
expect that the importance of the tilt eﬀect — if it is there — declines over time. That
is, the negative elasticity of the mispricing to inflation should become less negative over
the sample period.
We empirically assess this hypothesis. Figure 7 depicts point estimates and Newey
and West (1987) 95 percent confidence intervals of the univariate regressions of the
estimated mispricing on πt, it, and 1/it over a time-varying sample. We use the first
ten years of data to obtain an initial estimate of the slope coeﬃcient associated with
each regressor, and we then add one data point at a time and update our estimates. For
example, the point corresponding to 1992 first quarter is the estimated slope coeﬃcient
over the sample 1966 second quarter to 1992 first quarter.
Figure 7 Panels A, for the ψ-mispricing, and Panel D, for the ε-mispricing, reveal
that the trend goes, if anything, in the opposite direction of what we would expect if
the tilt eﬀect were the driving mechanism behind the empirical link between housing
prices and inflation. Over time, the negative relation between mispricing and inflation
becomes more negative. The elasticity with respect to the interest rate is essentially
flat (Panels B and E). Only the elasticity with respect to the log of the nominal interest
rate reciprocal seems to decline at the end of the sample for the ψ-mispricing (Panel
C), but this reduction is not statistically significant, while it is essentially flat for
the ε-mispricing (Panel F). Overall, these findings suggest that it is unlikely that the
tilt eﬀect is the mechanism behind the empirical link between housing mispricing and
inflation.
How do the findings in Figure 7 square with money illusion? Money illusion does
not have a clear implication as to whether the elasticity of mispricing to inflation should
vary over time. Nevertheless, the decline in the negative slope coeﬃcient (in Panel A
and D) is consistent with a setting in which households attention to inflation depends
on the recent history of inflation. Money illusion is very costly after and during a
period of high inflation. Hence, households are more attentive to inflation and less
prone to money illusion. In contrast, the cost of money illusion is perceived to be low
after and during a period of low inflation — as in the last part of our sample — and
hence money illusion is more wide-spread increasing the elasticity of the mispricing to
inflation.
4.2 Lock-in eﬀect
When inflation and interest rates creep up, households that have secured a non-portable
mortgage with a low fixed nominal interest rate in the past might be reluctant to buy
23See, for exampe, Lowenstein’s article in the New York Times on June 5, 2005 which cites the
Lehman Brothers report “The Changing Landscape of the Mortgage Market” which describes the
recent increase in interest-only mortgages.
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Figure 7: Point estimates and 95 percent Newey and West (1987) corrected confidence
bounds of slope coeﬃcients as sample size increases.
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a new, better quality house. This in turn could depress the demand for high-quality
houses and lower the supply for low-quality houses. Therefore, given that the pools of
rental houses and houses on the market for sale are not perfectly symmetric, this could
be the driving force of the empirical link between the price-rent ratio and the nominal
interest rate.
Noticing that this “lock-in eﬀect” is asymmetric — since it predicts an additional
reduction in housing demand for buying only when the interest rate is above the locked-
in interest rate — we can perform a series of tests to assess this hypothesis.
First, we run a set of regressions of our mispricing measures, ψ and ε, on the interest
rate and inflation interacted with a dummy variable that captures upward movements
in the interest rate over the last four quarters.
That is we run
μt = aˆi + bˆi1dtit + bˆi2 (1− dt) it + eˆit
μt = aˆπ + bˆπ1dtπt + bˆπ2 (1− dt)πt + eˆπt
where μt is either ψˆt or εˆt, and dt is an indicator function of upward movements in
the nominal interest rate it. The lock-in eﬀect suggests that the coeﬃcient estimate
bˆ·1 should be diﬀerent from bˆ·2. However, we cannot reject that bˆ·1 = bˆ·2 for both
regressions and both mispricing measures.
Second, using rolling samples (containing 10 years of observations each) we test
three separate hypotheses: Corr [R2t ,Dt] 6= 0; Corr [R2t , it] 6= 0; andCorr
£
R2t , pt − lt
¤ 6=
0, where R2t is the measure of fit of the regression of ψ on i in each rolling sample, Dt
is the average dt on a given subsample, and pt − lt is the average log price-rent ratio in
a given subsample. All theses hypotheses are rejected at standard confidence levels.
These results may not be surprising since most mortgages are portable in the U.K..
This is unlike in the U.S. where a large share of the mortgage contracts are not portable.
Nevertheless, as in the U.K., all stated hypotheses can be rejected with U.S. data also
except for Corr [R2t ,Dt] 6= 0.
5 Cross-regional Heterogeneity
In the previous section, we document money illusion as an aggregate phenomenon that
can generate house price run ups without changes in economic fundamentals. In this
section we explore whether money illusion can be reconciled with the observed regional
heterogeneity in price behavior within a country. In order to do this we shift our focus
from the U.K. to the U.S. housing market because the cross-sectional heterogeneity is
more prominent in the U.S. and more regional data is available. We first document
money illusion in the aggregate U.S. housing market. We then document heterogeneity
in housing supply elasticity at the state level and explain how money illusion and
31
heterogeneity in supply elasticity can rationalize the heterogeneity in regional price
dynamics.
5.1 Aggregate U.S.-Evidence
In this section we examine the link between housing market mispricing measures and
nominal values in the U.S. following the same procedure as in Section 3.2. The sample
period available runs from 1970:Q1—2004:Q3. Univariate regression results are reported
in Table 3. The first row shows that the proxies considered are all significant explana-
tory variables for the mispricing. Moreover, the sign of the estimated elasticity is the
one we would expect under inflation illusion: the mispricing of the price-rent ratio
tends to rise as inflation and nominal interest rates decrease. The coeﬃcient estimates
for the U.S. data are similar to the ones for the U.K. The measures of fit are somewhat
smaller compared to the U.K. case, but this is likely to be due to the shorter sample
period and poorer quality of U.S. data. An exception is the R2 for the expected rent
growth rate, which is higher for the U.S.
For a review of the measurement problems in U.S. data on housing see McCarthy
and Peach (2004). Nevertheless, the R2 ranges from 28 percent when the explana-
tory variable is the nominal interest rate to 45 percent when we use inflation as the
explanatory variable of the mispricing.
Dependent Variables: Regressors:
πt it log (1/it)
coeﬀ. R2 coeﬀ. R2 coeﬀ. R2
Panel A:
ψˆt −6.65
(4.525)
.45 −6.30
(3.182)
.28 .141
(4.256)
.35
∞P
τ=1
ρτ−1Eˆt∆let+τ −2.87
(6.572)
.65 −3.46
(6.170)
.65 .066
(4.693)
.60
−
∞P
τ=1
ρτ−1E˜treh,t+τ .76
(.211)
.01 4.65
(1.130)
.05 −.066
(.734)
.03
Panel B:
εˆt −10.2
(5.148)
.48 −6.86
(2.648)
.15 .159
(3.238)
.21
Table 4: Univariate Regressions on inflation, nominal interest rate and illusion proxy.
Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistics in brackets.
The second row shows that there is a significantly negative (positive) correlation
between inflation and nominal interest rate (log of the nominal interest rate reciprocal)
and expected future rent excess growth rates. This could either be a consequence
of a negative eﬀect of inflation on the real economy or due to a higher degree of
stickiness in housing rents than in the general price level. The regressors considered
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are able to explain between 60 to 65 percent of the time series variation in expected
future growth rates. The last row shows that there is a no statistically significant link
between inflation/nominal interest rate and future risk premia on housing investment.
The coeﬃcients for the U.S. are slightly lower compared to the U.K. coeﬃcient, which
is consistent with the diﬀerent tax treatment of mortgage interest payments in both
countries. Overall, these results imply a negative elasticity of the price-rent ratio to
inflation (nominal interest rates) of about 8.7 (5.1) and that the largest contribution
to this comes from the eﬀect of inflation (nominal interest rate) on mispricing.
Table 5 reports the results of a Monte Carlo exercise (described in Section A.2 of the
Appendix) analogous to the one presented in Section 3.2, which, as in the case of U.K.
data, confirms the soundness of the empirical link between mispricing in the housing
market and inflation, nominal interest rate and the log of the nominal interest rate
reciprocal. On the other hand, it shows that there is substantial uncertainty about the
rational links between inflation (nominal interest rate) and the price-rent ratio, even
though both variables show a significantly negative correlation with the risk premium
on the housing investment.
DepVar: Regressors:
πt it log (1/it)
coeﬀ. R2 coeﬀ. R2 coeﬀ. R2
Panel A:
ψˆt −6.06
[−7.32, −2.76]
.44
[.06, .66]
−5.84
[−7.12, −2.14]
.27
[.03, .66]
.130
[.070, .155]
.35
[.06, .60]
∞P
τ=1
ρτ−1Eˆt∆let+τ −2.86
[−8.17, 1.53]
.59
[.01, .96]
−3.45
[−7.27, −0.53]
.52
[.02, .71]
.066
[.003, .149]
.51
[.01, .70]
−
∞P
τ=1
ρτ−1t E˜reh,t+τ .44
[−4.84, 3.21]
.01
[0, .09]
4.23
[1.12, 5.82]
.04
[.01, .12]
−.023
[−.097, 0]
.07
[0, .15]
Panel B:
εˆt −10.2
[−16.2, −7.25]
.48
[.36, .62]
−6.83
[−10, −4.79]
.15
[.11, .21]
.159
[.115, .25]
.21
[.16, .26]
Table 5: Median and 95 percent confidence intervals for slope coeﬃcients and R2. U.S. data.
5.2 The U.S. Regional Housing Markets
In the previous section we documented the presence of money illusion in the aggregate
U.S. housing market. Yet house price shifts often vary significantly across diﬀerent
regions of the same country. In the U.S., the recent price increase seems to be much
less pronounced in the Midwest compared to the coastal regions. In this section we
investigate whether money illusion can be reconciled with these heterogeneous price
dynamics.
33
First, it should be mentioned that this regional heterogeneity is less extreme than
it appears at first sight, once one separates property prices into land value and build-
ing value. Davis and Palumbo (2006) analyze 46 large metropolitan areas in the U.S.
and find that the appreciation of residential land since the mid-1980s is a widespread
phenomenon because the price of residential land has risen much faster than housing
construction costs. The diﬀerent rates of increase in land and building value could
partially explain the observed cross-sectional heterogeneity in property price move-
ments. To be more explicit, consider the following stylized example. Suppose in the
low population density Midwest, 80 percent of the property value reflects the value of
the building, while in New York City the building value is say only 10 percent of the
property value. Then the same percentage increase in land price would cause a much
larger increase in property value in New York than in the Midwest.
Second, it is often argued that regional heterogeneity of property values is due to
diﬀerent housing supply elasticities. This could be another reason why money illusion
impacts house prices across various regions diﬀerently. To understand how supply
elasticity interacts with money illusion, let us consider a simple setting in which housing
demand, D (P, π), is decreasing in housing price, D1 := ∂D/∂P < 0, and inflation,
D2 := ∂D/∂π < 0, due to money illusion. The supply of housing S (P,X) is increasing
in house prices, S1 := ∂S/∂P > 0, and also aﬀected by cost shifters X. Applying the
implicit function theorem on the market clearing condition to obtain dP/dπ and taking
the derivative with respect to the slope of the supply function S1, one obtains
d (dP/dπ)
dS1
= − D2
(D1 − S1)2
> 0. (13)
Since S1 is inversely proportional to the elasticity of supply, this last equation shows
that money illusion can generate large price movements in area characterized by a
low elasticity of supply (high S1).24 Therefore, we study whether S1 changes across
regional markets.25 To do this, we nest our work in the housing supply literature
and try to estimate the elasticity of new housing starts to house price changes. The
existing literature has produced a wide range of both point estimates and conflicting
methodologies (see DiPasquale (1999) for a survey). Previous literature has focused
on the empirical link between new housing starts and the housing price level. On the
other hand Mayer and Somerville (1996) argue that housing starts are a flow variable
and therefore should be a function of other flow variables, and focus therefore on the
link between housing starts and housing price changes. Also, using a panel of U.S.
quarterly state-level data over the period 1975:Q1—2005:Q4, we find that the OFHEO
housing price indices seem to contain a unit root (as in Gallin (2003, 2004)), while
24If builders also suﬀer from money illusion, this result still holds as long as households suﬀer from
money illusion more than builders.
25In Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks (2007) heterogeneity in supply elasticity is the endogenous outcome
of households voting on zoning regulations.
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this hypothesis can be rejected for the new housing starts series. As a consequence, we
regress housing starts in state i, Iit, on the one-year price changes ∆Pit.
Note that our main interest is not to estimate the supply elasticity itself but to
assess how it varies across diﬀerent regions. In particular, we explore whether the
relative degree of land availability generates heterogeneity in supply elasticity. For this
purpose, we focus on an interaction term between prices, ∆Pit, and population density,
pdit. The previous literature has shown population density to be relevant in explaining
cross-sectional housing price diﬀerences since it captures the relative scarcity of land
(see e.g. Voith (1996)).
Regressing new housing starts on price change, we would expect a positive coef-
ficient for an upward-sloping supply curve. But, if high population density reduces
the elasticity of supply, adding as a regressor price changes interacted with population
density, ∆Pit × pdit, we would expect a negative coeﬃcient.
In order to distinguish movements along the supply curve from movements of the
supply curve, we introduce as controls a set of construction-cost shifters. The additional
regressors are the one-year change in the real ENR building cost index, the real interest
rate on the 3-months T-bill as a proxy for the cost of capital, and the one-year change
in the per capita state-specific real wage as a proxy for labor cost changes.
In our panel regressions we also control for state fixed eﬀects and state specific
cyclicality using state specific quarterly dummies. In addition, we add to our regressions
a third order polynomial in a linear time trend and the time series of state population
densities. We also add lagged new housing starts, Iit−1, to capture the high degree of
persistence of the regressand. Population density is constructed removing water area
from the total state area and the series is normalized to have unit mean. Nominal
values are made real using the CPI less shelter. Unfortunately, we do not have data on
land prices at the state level to add as an additional control. Following the previous
literature, we include inflation to the regressions, and we also interact inflation with
population density.
Since we have quarterly data over the period 1975:Q1—2005:Q4 for 50 states plus the
District of Columbia, our sample size of 5865 observations implies that our regressions
have more than 5640 degrees of freedom. Since prices, construction costs and wages are
potentially endogenously determined, we need to perform IV estimates. As instruments
we use all the exogenous variables and their first lag, all the dummies and trends, and
the first two lags of the endogenous variables. Weak instruments do not seem to be an
issue since the measures of fit of the first stage regression range between .70 for price
changes to .82 for the ENR building cost index. We also employ a heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent estimator of the covariance matrix with Newey andWest
(1987) windows of 12 lags, and corrected to take into account the use of instrumental
variables.
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Regressors: R¯2
Iit−1 ∆Pit ∆Pit × pdit πt πt × pdit rt
(1) .901
(47.24)
.843
(1.871)
−.064
(2.796)
−10.9
(4.424)
.172
(.0311)
.97
(2) .901
(47.54)
.710
(1.659)
−11.26
(4.471)
.274
(3.152)
.195
(.0354)
.97
(3) .901
(47.17)
.833
(1.844)
−.064
(2.787)
−11.14
(2.515)
.228
(2.758)
.140
(.0253)
.97
Table 6: Regressions of housing starts on its lag, yearly price-change, inflation and on
interaction terms. Coeﬃcients of additional controls are not reported. Corrected t-statistics
in brackets.
Table 6 reports the point estimates of the main coeﬃcients of interest in our panel
regression. The first row shows, as expected, a positive correlation between price
changes and new housing starts but the regression coeﬃcient is significant only at the
10 percent level. Most importantly, the interaction term between price changes and
population density is negative and highly statistically significant, suggesting that the
elasticity of housing supply is reduced in areas where land is relatively scarce. Inflation
shows a significantly negative relationship with housing starts as already found in Topel
and Rosen (1988). This last finding is consistent with the proxy eﬀect of inflation but
also with a setting in which rational builders are aware that households suﬀer from
money illusion. Indeed, Topel and Rosen (1988) find the eﬀect of inflation on housing
starts to be too strong to be explained by their rational investment model. The real
interest rate is not significant. The second row replaces the interaction term∆Pit×pdit
with the interaction of inflation and population density, πt×pdit. The point estimate of
the other coeﬃcients is almost unchanged and price changes are statistically significant
only at the 10 percent level while inflation is highly significant and the real interest
rate is not. Interestingly, πt×pdit has a positive sign suggesting that inflation tends to
reduce supply less in high density areas. The last row uses both interaction terms, and
confirms the results of the previous regressions and also shows that the two interaction
terms have diﬀerent information content since they are both strongly significant even
when employed jointly.
For robustness, we also performed regressions in which we modeled parametrically
autoregression in the residuals, without obtaining significantly diﬀerent results. Fi-
nally, we performed structural estimations of the investment model of Topel and Rosen
(1988), but adding an interaction term between prices, inflation and population den-
sity. Even though these last estimations regress housing starts on price levels, instead
of price changes, we obtained qualitatively similar results.
Overall, the results in this section reconcile the presence of money illusion as an
aggregate phenomenon and regional diﬀerences in price behavior.
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6 Conclusion
This paper studies the link between inflation and housing prices. Our first-cut approach
shows that the housing price-rent ratio is not aﬀected by the real, but by the nominal
interest rate. Moreover, we decompose time-series movements of the price-rent ration
into movements in a rational component and an implied mispricing component. We
find that movements in inflation explain a large share of the time variation of the
mispricing. These results are robust and hold for both the U.K. and the U.S. housing
markets.
Two potential explanations of the link between the price-rent ratio and inflation
naturally arise. First, inflation might make the economy riskier, or agents more risk
averse, therefore increasing risk premia and driving down real estate prices. Second,
current high inflation might be disruptive for the economy and/or inflation might proxy
for future downturns, therefore depressing current housing value. We do not find
supportive evidence for the first hypothesis while the evidence in favor of the second
hypothesis does not seem to be robust in the housing market context.
We also investigate possible explanations due to market frictions. First, inflation
may tilt real mortgage payments towards the earlier years, making funding constraints
potentially more binding. Second, an increase in inflation may dampen the demand for
housing upgrades from individuals that have locked-in low nominal interest rates on an
existing mortgages. Our extensive series of tests suggests that these market frictions
are unlikely to be the mechanism behind the link between inflation and housing market
mispricing. We also document substantial heterogeneity in housing supply elasticity
across U.S. states due to diﬀerences in relative land scarcity, and we argue that this
could reconcile our evidence of an aggregate money illusion phenomenon in housing
markets with the observed heterogeneity in regional price behavior.
We therefore interpret our findings as supportive evidence for the money illusion
hypothesis. Our findings provide a new argument in favor of price stability, since
residential housing is the single largest asset class of households.
Several potential future research avenues come to mind. First, the analysis could
be extended to a cross-section of countries to assess the role of institutional features.
Preliminary results for Australia are also supportive of the money illusion hypothesis.
Second, it would be interesting to study the common root of money illusion in markets
as diﬀerent as the residential housing market, the commercial real estate market and
the stock and bond markets.
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A Appendix
A.1 Data Description
A.1.1 U.K. Data
The housing price series is from the Nationwide Building Society, and covers the sample
period 1966:Q2—2005:Q1. Over the period 1966:Q2—2005:Q5 the index is constructed
as a weighted average using floor area, therefore allowing to control for the influence
of house size. Over the periods 1974:Q1—1982:Q4, and 1983:Q1—1992:Q1 additional
controls (for region, property type, etc.) have been added in the construction of the
index. Since 1993 the index also takes into account changes in the neighborhood
classification. The rent series is constructed combining several sources available through
the Oﬃce of National Statistics. Over the period 1966:01—1987:01 we use the CTMK
LA:HRA series of rents on dwellings paid by tenants in the U.K. and we combine
it with the data on the stock of housing available trough the Oﬃce of the Deputy
Prime Minister. Over the period 1987:02—1987:12 we use the RPI-SGPE rent series of
monthly percent changes over one month. Over the period 1988:01—2005:02 we use the
CZCQ - RPI series of percent changes in rent over one year. The rent-free tenancies are
excluded from the calculation of average rents. To obtain a series in levels for the price-
rent ratio we scale the index series to match the level of the average price-rent ratio in
1990. As interest rate we use the 20-year par yield on British Government Securities
available over the sample 1963:Q4—2004:Q4. All the results presented in the paper
are based on the longest possible sample given the data at hand (1966:Q2—2004:Q4).
The cross-regional price variability is computed as the variance of the Nationwide
quarterly log price index across the main 14 macro regions of the U.K. available over
the period 1973:Q3—2005:Q4. Total within country migration probability is computed
over the period 1975:Q1—2004:Q4 from the NHSCR quarterly tables using total inflows
and outflows of England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland normalized total U.K.
resident population.
The implied inflation series, available over the period 1982:Q1—2005:Q1, is from the
Bank of England and is constructed using the inflation protected 10 years government
securities.
The real GDP measure is the seasonally adjusted, chained volume measures with
constant 2002 prices and is available over the period 1955:Q1—2005:Q1 from the Oﬃce
of National Statistics.
A.1.2 U.S. Data
Aggregate Data. To construct the housing price index series we use (i) the weighted
repeat-sale housing price index form the Oﬃce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
over the sub-sample 1976:01—2004:03 and the (ii) Census Bureau housing price index
43
(obtained through the Bank of International Settlements) over the period 1970:01—
1975:04. To construct the rent index we use the CPI-Rent from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. We re-scale the indexes to levels to match the historical average of the U.S.
price-rent ratio over the same sample (as reported in Ayuso and Restoy (2003)). As
long-run interest rate we use the return on the 10-year Treasury bill. As measure of
inflation we use the CPI index without housing.
Regional Data. As housing price index we use the quarterly OFHEO Housing Price
Index (HPI) for 50 states and the District of Columbia over the period 1975:Q1—
2005:Q4. The availability of these data series determines the sample of the panel
analysis. As new housing starts measure we use the quarterly not seasonally adjusted
state level Private Housing Units Permits Authorized series from the Markets database
available through Global Insight. The labor cost measure is the state level quarterly
total Wages and Salary series provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. As state
population measure we use the yearly total resident population estimates provided by
the Bureau of Census of the U.S. Department of Commerce. The series are interpolated
at quarterly frequency. We compute state land area as total area minus water area
from the Census 2000 data. As building cost proxy we use the aggregate quarterly
not seasonally adjusted Engineering News Record (ENR) Building Cost Index (BCI)
average of 20 U.S. cities. The BCI is a weighted index of skilled labor, structural steel
shapes, portland cement and lumber costs. Nominal values are made real using the
CPI less shelter price index.
A.2 Assessing Uncertainty
To assess uncertainty in the regression results in Table 2, we report 95 percent confi-
dence intervals for the estimated slope coeﬃcients and R2constructed via Monte Carlo
integration by drawing form the posterior distribution of the estimated VAR coeﬃ-
cients. We proceed as follows:
1. We draw covariance matrices Σ` from the inverseWishart with parameters
³
nΣˆ
´−1
and n−m.
2. Conditional on Σ` we draw a vector of coeﬃcients for the VAR, β`, from
β` ∼ N
³
βˆ, Σ`⊗ (X 0X)−1
´
.
3. Using the draws of the VAR slope coeﬃcients, β`, we construct expected dis-
counted sums of rent excess growth rates (
P∞
τ=1 ρ
τ−1E`t∆let+τ) and obtain the
excess housing returns (
P∞
τ=1 ρ
τ−1E`treh,t+τ) in order to compute pricing errors ψ`
and ε`.
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4. We then regress ψ`t, ε`,
P∞
τ=1 ρ
τ−1E`t∆let+τ and
P∞
τ=1 ρ
τ−1
t E`treh,t+τ on πt, it and
the log of the inflation-biased evaluation 1/it, and we store the estimated slope
coeﬃcients and measures of fit.
5. We repeat this procedure 10,000 times and compute confidence intervals for the
OLS slope coeﬃcients associated with πt, it and the log of 1/it, and for the
corresponding measures of fit, from the corresponding percentiles of the Monte
Carlo iterations.
A.3 Assessing the Role of the Business Cycle
To construct a business cycle proxy for the U.K. we follow Hodrick and Prescott (1997),
that is we estimated the following state-space model
∆yt = gt + ct (14)
gt = 2gt−1 − gt−2 + vt
where ∆yt is GDP growth from quarter t − 5 to quarter t, gt is the unobserved state
variable meant to capture the smooth time varying trend, and ct is the cyclical compo-
nent. The variance of vt is normalized to be 1/1600 times the variance of the cyclical
component, ct, as it is customary with quarterly data. This state-space representation
is estimated via Kalman filter and Kalman smoother.
Figure 8 plots the time series of the U.K. exponentially smoothed quarterly infla-
tion, the return on the twenty-year Government Bonds, and the Hodrick and Prescott
(1997) filtered estimate of the GDP business cycle. The HP-estimate seems to capture
fairly well the business cycle over the period considered. Moreover, there is no clear
comovment between inflation and the business cycle.
Table A1 reports OLS regressions of our mispricing measures (εˆt and ψˆt) on the
variables meant to capture money illusion (πt, it and log (1/i)) and the business cycle
component of GDP identified by the H-P filter (cˆt).
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Figure 8: U.K. business cycle and inflation
Regressors:
Row: Dep. variable: cˆt πt it log (1/i) R2
(1) ψˆt 0.81
(1.959)
.07
(2) 0.32
(2.135)
−4.00
(13.761)
.85
(3) 0.378
(2.168)
−6.64
(11.137)
.76
(4) 0.50
(2.590)
0.13
(8.121)
.71
(5) ψˆ
0
t 1.11
(0.963)
.01
(6) 0.36
(0.349)
−5.98
(2.279)
.17
(7) 0.41
(0.369)
−10.5
(2.436)
.17
(8) 0.55
(0.503)
0.24
(2.605)
.19
(9) εˆt 0.85
(2.201)
.07
(10) 0.41
(2.281)
−3.80
(7.801)
.67
(11) 0.49
(2.158)
−6.10
(6.399)
.57
(12) 0.60
(2.462)
0.12
(5.769)
.56
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Table A1. Regressions on business cycle fluctuations, inflation, nominal interest rate, and
illusion proxy. Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistics in brackets.
It is clear from the first and fifth rows of Table A1 that the business cycle as little
(in the case of εˆt) or no (in the case of ψˆt) explanatory power for the mispricing.
The remaining rows clearly show that the inclusion of the business cycle in the OLS
regressions for the mispricing a) does not drive out the statistical significance of πt,
it and log (1/it), b) does not significantly change the point estimates of the elasticities
of the mispricing reported in Table 1, c) does not increase significantly our ability to
explain the time variation in the mispricing (comparing Table A1 to Table 1, we have
that the increase in R2 is ranges from 0 to 4 percent, and there is virtually no increases
in the — non reported — R¯2).
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